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HorizontalMergers:Law,Policy,and Economics
By GEORGE A.

HAY AND GREGORY J. WERDEN*

The legalityof a horizontalmergerunder
section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a
reckoning of its social costs and benefits.
This paper reviews what economics has to
say about that reckoning and explores the
relationshipbetween economiclearningand
mergerlaw and policy.'
I. The Costs and Benefits of Mergers

The main social cost associatedwith horizontal mergersarises fromtheir potentialto
raise price and restrict output. Oligopoly
models offer insights into such effects, and
we consider them in two groups: models
that involve something termed "collusion"
and models that do not.
Collusion models began with Edward
Chamberlin.He argued that, if competitors
were sufficientlyfew, they would recognize
the benefit from actingcooperativelyand do
so, achievingjoint profit maximizationwithout communication.This notion of tacit collusion captured the imaginationof economists. Difficultiesin reachingan agreement
on price were recognized,but the incentive
to do so was arguedto be very powerful.
George Stigler's (1964) highly influential
model focused on the problemof enforcing
an agreement. Enforcement depends cru-

* Hay: Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853; Werden: Antitrust Division, U.S.
Departmentof Justice,555 FourthSt. N.W., Washington, DC 20001. The views expressedherein are not
purportedto reflect those of the U.S. Departmentof
Justice.A longerversionof this paperis availableas an
EconomicAnalysisGroupDiscussionPaper.
1Wealso note that the most importantcontributions
made by economicsto mergerlaw and policywere the
most basic.Economicsprovideda rationalefor merger
policy by explainingthe welfare effects of monopoly.
Economics set the task for merger enforcementby
explainingthat mergershave both costs and benefits.
Economicsprovidedbasic constructscriticalto understanding markets: supply and demand, equilibrium,
opportunitycost, and especially,economicrationality.
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cially on being able to detect cheating, and
Stigler showed that detection is easier with
fewer firms.
More recently, game theory has underscored the importance of Stigler's insight
and has shown that Chamberlin'snotion
cannot be capturedin a one-shot game because the incentiveto cheat is more powerful than the incentive to agree. Models of
repeated games, however, have breathed
new life into the notion of tacit collusionby
demonstratingthat joint maximizationis an
equilibriumof a repeatedgame with threats
of punishment,provided that the discount
factor is sufficientlyhigh (see Carl Shapiro,
1989).
Collusion models generally support a
structuralmerger policy but do not make
predictionssufficientlyclear to be useful in
identifying which mergers should be prevented. The models of Chamberlin and
Stigler predict that increasedconcentration
from mergers can lead to collusion and
identify factors facilitating collusion; however, neither makes more specific predictions. Models of repeated games indicate
that tacit collusionis possible even with very
large numbersof firmsand predictonly that
collusion is one of many possible equilibria
(see e.g., CarlShapiro,1989,pp. 364-6, 371,
379).
Noncollusionmodels provideclearerpredictions. The Bertrandmodel yields a oneshot Nash equilibriumin prices. With differentiated products, Raymond Deneckere
and Carl Davidson (1985) have demonstrated fairly generally that mergers in
Bertrandmodels raise price. Auction models are a variationon the Bertrandtheme,
incorporatinguncertaintyabout costs or values, and they make similarpredictions.
The Cournot model yields a one-shot
Nash equilibrium in quantities. Joseph
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have demonstrated that mergersin Cournotmodels always raise price. A limiting case of the
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Cournotmodel is the dominant-firmmodel,
and in this model acquisitionsof fringefirms
by the dominantfirmnecessarilyraise price.
The Cournot model has endured a centuryof criticism.The oldest criticismis that
settingprices ratherthan quantitiesis more
realisticand that predictionsare drastically
different with price-setting.This objection
has not been disposed of completely, but
David Kreps and Jose Scheinkman(1983)
have shown that capacity-settingfollowed
by price-setting yields a Cournot equilibrium, provided that rationing is efficient.
Other objectionsare that firms can do better and that Cournot behavior is inconsistent with rational expectations, but game
theory has exploded both objectionswithin
the context of one-shot games (see Andrew
Daughety,1985).The Cournotmodel also is
the only one for which it has been shown
that price and output effects of mergersare
well predicted by conventional measures
of market shares and concentration (see
Werden, 1991a).
The most telling objectionto all oligopoly
models is that they are too simplistic,ignoring essential dynamicand strategic aspects
of competition.There is no satisfactoryanswer to this objection,but the detailed analysis done in actualmergerinvestigationsfills
some of the gaps left by oligopolymodels.
It is desirable to have an empiricalbasis
for merger policy, and until the mid-1970's
most economists probablybelieved that interindustry concentration-profits studies
providedthat basis.These studieshave since
been attacked on many fronts, and few
economists continue to believe that such
studiesprovidea substantialbasisfor merger
policy (see Werden, 1991b pp. 16-17).
Richard Schmalensee (1989 p. 988) has
deemed intraindustrystudies of the relationshipbetween concentrationand price to
be the best empiricalfoundationfor merger
policy(for surveys,see LeonardWeiss [1989]
and Werden [1991b]). These studies have
significantproblems as well, but most suggest that the Cournot predictionis roughly
right (see Luke Froeb and Werden, 1991
pp. 12-13).
Ideally,we wopildwant to base policy on
experiencewith actual consummatedmerg-
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ers, but only a handfulof such mergershave
been studied. David Barton and Roger
Sherman(1984), Severin Borenstein(1990),
and Werden et al. (1991) examined four
mergers that were opposed by federal antitrust enforcement agencies and that involved large shares in the relevantmarkets.
They found that at least three raised price
significantly. Lawrence Schumann et al.
(1992) examinedthree mergersnot opposed
by federal antitrust enforcement agencies.
They found that at most one raised price
significantly.
There is less economic learning on the
social benefits of mergersthan on their social costs. Oligopoly theory makes no important predictions about mergers efficiencies. The empiricalliterature indicates
that shareholders benefit from takeovers
(see e.g., Michael Jensen and Richard
Ruback,1983),but shareholderswould benefit from anticompetitivemergersas well as
efficientones. It also indicatesthat mergers
generallyhave not increased the profitability of the acquiredfirms,but few significant
horizontalmergershave been examined(see
e.g., David Ravenscraftand F. M. Scherer,
1987 [especiallypp. 211-12]). We know of
no publishedcase studies evaluatingin detail the effectsof particularmergerson costs.
Economicsalso offers little in the way of
tools for assessing the magnitudeof likely
efficiencies from proposed mergers. Moreover, efficiencies may not be unique to
merger(i.e., they maybe achievable,at least
to some extent,withouthorizontalmergers),
and it is difficultto assess the feasibilityof
varioussorts of contractsand joint ventures
that can be used to achieve the same efficiencies.

Also criticalto the social costs and benefits of mergersare prospectsfor entry.Economics offers many useful insights about
entry, but reliable predictionsnormallyare
not possible. Theory has demonstrated
the crucial role of sunk costs (see William
Baumol et al., 1982), but it has not indicated how large sunk costs must be or how
long investmentsmust be committedin order to deter entry(see e.g., MariusSchwartz,
1986). Experienceteaches that entry can be
a powerfulengine for competition-so pow-
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market delineation. The 1968 Guidelines
made no mention of entry and considered
efficienciesto be a possible defense only in
"exceptionalcircumstances."
Merger policy over the past decade has
differed markedlyfrom that in the 1960's.
The changes are largelyattributableto new
II. MergerLawand Policy
economic learning, and the 1982 Merger
Two Supreme Court cases in the early Guidelines were a major milestone. Those
1960's established the case law's basic ap- Guidelines were the first importantpolicy
statementto relyexplicitlyon oligopolymodproach to mergers under section 7 of the
ClaytonAct. Economiclearningshaped this els. They devoted a great deal of attention
to collusionmodels and a little to the domicase law, but the courts generally did not
nant-firm model. Their creator, William
cite it. In Brown Shoe, the Court set out
criteria for market delineation, including Baxter,rejectedChamberlin'sview of oligocross elasticity of demand, borrowed from poly, and their market-shareand concentraeconomics, and seven infamous "practical tion presumptionswere much less restricindicia" for delineating "submarkets."In tive than those in the 1968 Guidelines.The
1982 Guidelines created safe harbors for
PhiladelphiaNational Bank, the Court establisheda presumptionof illegalityfor hor- mergersin marketswith (postmerger)HHI's
izontal mergers based on market shares, below 1,000 and for mergersthat increased
and this presumptionwas justified in part the HHI less than 50. The 1982 Guidelines
on the groundsthat it was "fully consonant placed substantialweight on entryconsiderations and considered efficiencies to be a
with economictheory."
These two decisions led to hundreds of
possible defense in "extraordinarycircumstances." The 1982 Guidelines also articuothers in which markets typicallywere delineated arbitrarilyand mergers were held lated market-delineationprinciplesbased on
unlawful even when the alleged, markets the fundamentalconcern in merger cases:
marketpower.
were relatively unconcentrated and the
combined market shares of the merging
The 1984 Merger Guidelineswere a mifirmswere less than 10 percent.Apart from nor revisionaimed primarilyat takingsome
of the weight off the numbersand perhaps
the oblique reference in PhiladelphiaNational Bank, the only other reference to
relaxingthe standards.The 1984 Guidelines
economic theory was one in Rome Cable, considered efficiencies in all cases but reapparently to Chamberlin's notion. Effi- quired "clear and convincingevidence."
ciencies were held to be grounds for conThe case law over the past decade also
demning a merger, and entry was barely differs greatly from that discussed above,
mentioned. In dissent, Justice Potter Stew- and the 1982 Merger Guidelines and new
art wrote: "The sole consistencythat I can
economic learning probably have been
find is that in litigationunder ?7, the Gov- largelyresponsiblefor the changes.We susernmentalwayswins."
pect that objections to the concentrationIn this era, economiclearninghad greater profitsstudies have played a significantrole
influenceon mergerpolicy. Donald Turner, in the relaxationof merger standards.The
a HarvardPh.D. in economics and an adcase law still relies little on oligopolymodherent of Chamberlin'sview of oligopoly, els, but references to them have become
was responsiblefor the 1968 MergerGuide- more prominent,and all have been to collulines. Their restrictive market share and sion models. Earlier cases holding that efconcentrationthresholdsno doubt reflected ficiencies were grounds for condemning,
the conventional economic wisdom of the
rather than permitting, mergers have not
been explicitlyoverruled,but only a radical
day. The 1968 Guidelinesdid not adopt the
"practical indicia" or "submarket"confringe consider them to be good law today.
cepts, but stili entertained rather arbitrary Many relativelyrecent cases have adopted

erful that mergersmay not matter. Experience also teaches that marketpowermaybe
exercisedfor a long time despite the possibility of entry.
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and applied the importantinsightson market delineation in the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The two most notable features of
mergerlaw over the past decade have been
that the governmentgenerallyhas lost and
that the stated rationalemost often was that
entry or the threat of entry would prevent
or cure any anticompetitiveeffects.
The 1992 Guidelines pay roughly equal
attention to collusion models and the
Bertrandmodel for differentiatedproducts.
While not invokedin an easily recognizable
way,the Cournotand dominant-firmmodels
also are mentioned. The 1992 Guidelines
devote extraordinaryattention to entry.
Their extensive discussion is difficult to
summarize,but the importantpoint is that
the 1992 Guidelines offer what is meant to
be a means of predictingwhether entrywill
prevent or cure any anticompetitiveeffects
of a merger.
III. Conclusions

Mergerlaw and policy have come a long
way under the guidanceof economic learning, and we think that both are basically
sound. While there is considerableroom for
disagreementabout the implicationsof economic learningfor mergerpolicy,we believe
that there is a sufficient theoretical and
empiricalbasis for a structuralmerger policy that accordsproperweight to considerations of entryand efficiencies.The Cournot,
the Bertrand, dominant-firm, and other
models support the prevention of at least
very substantialmergers in most cases, as
does the limited empiricalevidence.
Collusionof varioussorts does occur and
is a real concern in merger cases; however,
the available evidence indicates that collusion concernsdo not justifya mergerpolicy
significantlymore restrictivethan that suggested by noncollusive models. While the
presence or absence of factors facilitating
collusion certainly is relevant in merger
cases, the absence of such factors does not
justify permittinga merger if noncollusive
models and the facts of the particularcase
indicate that the merger's costs exceed its
benefits.Noncollusionmodels should be relied on more than they have been.
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Followingthe adviceof economists,there
has been a pronouncedmovementin merger
law and policyawayfromrelianceon simple
presumptions,and it may have gone too far.
There certainly is an importantrole to be
played by careful economic analysisof particularmergers.The economist'sbasic tools
applied to the detailed facts of an actual
industrymay yield valuable insights. However, we should not kid ourselvesabout our
ability to predict accuratelythe effects of
particularmergers.Estimationof the price
and output effects of mergers(assumingno
efficiencies)is rather crude, and estimation
of the magnitudeof unique efficienciesand
prediction about entry are even less reliable.
In light of these limitations,we think that
there is considerablemerit to a mergerpolicy that relies to some extent on simple
rules and that makes no pretextof explicitly
measuringthe costs and benefits of particular mergers. In addition to the fact that
there may be no reasonable alternative,
simple rules have significant advantages.
They make enforcement far more predictable, benefiting business planning, and
they make enforcement less expensive.
While the accuracyof court decisions may
suffer,that is not so clear. It may come as a
blow to economists'vanity,but the outcome
of merger litigation probablyis not greatly
affectedby careful economic analysis.
Simple rules come in many flavors,some
of which are more popularthan others. The
most popularis the delineationof safe harbors based on concentration and market
shares. Another fairly popular one is considering efficiencies primarilyimplicitly,in
formulatingmarketshare and concentration
standards.Less popularare rules presuming
mergersto be unlawfulon the basis of market shares and concentration,but we favor
such presumptions under certain circumstances. Thresholdsfor makinga challenge
truly likely should be fairly high (e.g., an
HHI of 2,500 and a change of 500), and
even then, entry,efficiencies,and other factors should be considered. We also would
not invoke any such presumptionsfor differentiated products or products sold
through auction mechanisms. For such
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products,more direct estimationof the effects of mergers,focusing on the degree of
head-to-headcompetition,would be better.
As we learn more, we can expect merger
law and policy to adapt. We hope that neither will be too receptiveto the latest developments in oligopoly theory or the latest
empirical results. One clear message from
history is that new ideas and results ultimately may have little policy relevance.Papers with strong, and unjustifiable,policy
conclusions appear regularly,even in The
American Economic Review.
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